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Abstract 
This contribution takes one of Advocate General Fennelly’s most influential 
Opinions during his time at the European Court of Justice – the Opinion in 
Case C-376/98 known as Tobacco advertising I – as a starting point to look at 
developments in the internal market legislation of the European Union since. 
It thereby explores the diversifying limits to integration by harmonisation of 
national law for the ‘establishment and functioning of the internal market’ 
(Article 114 TFEU) by the adoption of substantive and procedural ‘measures’ 
under EU law in the past decade and a half.
I. INTRODUCTION
THE EUROPEAN UNION’S (EU) internal market is an ‘area without internal frontiers in which the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured’ (Article 26 TFEU) inter alia by the possibility 
for the EU legislature to adopt ‘measures’ for its establishment and functioning 
(Article 114 TFEU). Defining the outer limits of this legal basis1 for the adoption 
of ‘measures’ has always been a complex task, but it has become more so in 
* Professor of European and Transnational Public Law, Jean Monnet Chair; University of 
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1 On this notion in EU law generally, see K Bradley,‘Powers and procedures in the EU Constitution: 
Legal bases and the Court‘ in P Craig and G de Búrca, The Evolution of  EU Law 2nd edn (Oxford, 
OUP, 2011) 85.
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the past decade and a half, not least because of two main factors. The first is 
that regulation which is relevant for the establishment and the functioning of 
the internal market can rarely be completely disassociated from the regulation 
of other policy areas. Product rules, for example, will also have an influence 
on health, safety and environmental standards. Free movement of services and 
workers, as well as rules on the establishment of businesses and self-employed 
persons will have an immediate influence on matters such as social security systems 
and labour policies, professional qualifications and education, to name just a few. 
This means that balancing economic rights with social and political rights is a 
key feature of regulation of the internal market.2 The second contributing factor 
to the difficulties of defining the limits to the Union’s power to adopt internal 
market legislation is an increasing diversification of the forms of ‘measures’, 
in the context of the steady transformation of the EU from an organisation 
primarily engaged in legislative action into an organisation increasingly active in 
the field of the administrative implementation of Union law.
In the area of internal market regulation, therefore, there are many hard 
cases on the reach of internal market-related legislative powers of the Union. In 
this chapter, I will outline some of the major developments of the past decade 
and a half in this field starting with Advocate General (AG) Fennelly’s Opinion 
in 2000 in Tobacco advertising I3  on issues of the definition of the possible 
extent of legislative ‘measures’ and the limits thereof in the context of the 
principle of conferral, expanding and explaining Titanium dioxide4 and laying 
the foundations of Alliance for Natural Health.5 This contribution laid many 
of the foundations on which the following complex issues of structural and 
procedural integration were based. I will discuss these regarding the concepts 
of subsidiarity and proportionality which were further explored in Vodafone,6 
Smoke flavourings, 7 ENISA8 and, more recently, Short selling.9 I will add a 
different dimension by looking at the notion of ‘measures’ not only from a 
substantive and legislative angle, but additionally review the issue of the limits 
on the legislature’s discretion in this regard from their structural, institutional 
and implementing perspective. I will discuss the various parameters of the limits 
of legislative powers for the harmonisation of the internal market, first, from the 
more traditional angle of the limits of legislative measures adopted by the EU 
(I), before turning to the question of using the internal market related powers 
to establish structural and procedural measures coordinating Member State 
2 S Weatherill, ‘Free Movement of Goods’ (2012) 61 ICLQ 541, 545.
3 Opinion of 15 June 2000 in Case C-376/98 Germany v Parliament and Council (Tobacco 
advertising I) [2000] ECR I-8423.
4 Case C-300/89 Commission v Council [1991] ECR I-2867.
5 Joined Cases C-154/04 and C-155/04 The Queen, on the application of  the Alliance for Natural 
Health and Ors v Secretary of  State for Health and National Assembly for Wales [2005] ECR I-6451.
6 Case C-58/08 Vodafone and Others [2010] ECR I-4999.
7 Case C-66/04 UK v Parliament and Council (Smoke flavorings) [2005] ECR I-10553.
8 Case C-217/04 UK v Parliament and Council (ENISA) [2006] ECR I-3771.
9  Opinion of AG Jääskinen of 12 September 2013 in Case C-270/12 UK v Council and Parliament 
(Short selling), judgment of 22 January 2014. The Opinion is discussed by H Marjosola, ‘Case 
C-270/12 (UK v Parliament and Council) – Stress Testing Consitutional Resiliance of the Powers of 
EU Financial Supervisory Authorities’ (2014/02) EUI Law Working Papers.
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implementation of EU law (II). These discussions are brought together in a new 
generation of cases starting with Short selling (III), which I will discuss briefly 
before drawing some conclusions from the diverse developments in EU internal 
market legislation for the future of Union powers (IV).  
II. LIMITS OF LEGISLATIVE ‘MEASURES’ HARMONISING MEMBER STATE 
LAW
Limitations on the legislative powers of the Union are to be found first and 
foremost in the three basic principles of Union competence listed in Article 5 
TEU: the principle of the limited attribution of powers to the Union, generally 
known as the principle of conferral; the principle of subsidiarity; and the 
principle of proportionality of Union action.10
1. Conferral
One of the cornerstones of the definition of the notion of conferral was given 
by AG Fennelly’s Opinion in Tobacco advertising I,11 on the basis of which the 
Court famously clarified and re-stated that a legislative act which is based on 
Article 114 TFEU may not simply reduce or eliminate regulatory differences 
between the Member States. Teleologically speaking, Article 114 TFEU is not 
available in order to level regulatory differences between the Member States 
without restriction. Instead, a measure under Article 114 TFEU must actively 
contribute in some way or another to the creation or functioning of the internal 
market. This has been heralded as a ‘momentous’ ruling,12 since in it the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ)13 for the first time concluded that a legislative 
act of the EU harmonising national legislation was ultra vires the rules of what 
is now Article 114 TFEU as breaching the principle of conferral.
The case concerned the highly controversial first Directive on tobacco 
advertising.14 According to its preamble, the Directive sought to approximate 
national laws on products and services which until then had traditionally been 
used as media for advertising tobacco and tobacco products. These included 
newspapers and magazines, goods such as umbrellas and perfumes, as well as 
services such as broadcasting and sports events. Divergent national rules on 
the treatment of such goods and services were addressed by the Directive in a 
way which, to many commentators, appeared to be driven predominantly by 
10 Article 5 TEU.
11 N 3 above.
12 Weatherill (n 2 above), 547.
13 The abbreviation ‘ECJ’ refers to the Court of Justice, part of the Union’s judicial institution, 
the Court of Justice of the European Union; ECJ is therefore to be understood as opposed to the 
General Court, the former Court of First Instance.
14 Directive 98/43 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 1998 on the 
approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States relating 
to the advertising and sponsorship of tobacco products [1998] OJ L213/9.
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the intention to combat smoking and thus to be oriented towards consumer 
health protection. The Treaty provisions on public health at the time of the 
adoption of the contested Tobacco advertising I directive (Article 167(6) 
TFEU), however, explicitly excluded, and continue to exclude even now, ‘any 
harmonisation of the laws and regulations of the Member States’. In the 
absence of a legal basis for measures harmonising in the field of health, the 
Directive was designed as a measure for the approximation of rules for the 
single market which, as is required by Article 114(3) TFEU, attempt to ensure 
a high level of health protection. 
The choice of legal basis under the principle of conferral is an area to which 
the ECJ applies full judicial review. The choice is based on what the Court 
refers to as objective criteria, clarifying that this choice is not a matter which 
falls within the political discretion of the decision-maker. This is the context in 
which the Court, following AG Fennelly, and enforcing the concept of the limited 
attribution of powers to the Union, found that Article 114 TFEU is not linked 
to a specific policy matter but, under its functional approach, must be reviewed 
by assessing the ‘objective requirements of the internal market’.15 These include 
in particular, ‘the concrete internal market benefits claimed for the measure’16 
as a ‘test of the reality of the link between such measures and the internal-
market objectives.’17 Effectively, prohibiting activity within a sector without 
harmonising Member State laws concerning that sector or the remaining legal 
activity therein cannot, in the words of Advocate General Fennelly, be said to 
facilitate the exercise of the fundamental freedoms in the internal market, or 
‘remove distortions of completion in the sector in question.’18 
By contrast, Advocate General Fennelly explains that in order to be within the 
scope of application of Article 114 TFEU, measures approximating Member 
State laws would have to satisfy a two-step test: they ‘should be specific to 
the sector, however widely drawn, and should not be merely incidental’.19 
Advocate General Fennelly thereby applied and clarified the approach adopted 
in Titanium dioxide under which the distortion of competition leading to 
a harmonising measure had to be ‘appreciable’.20 Given that in the view of 
the Advocate General and the Court the Directive did not have a sufficiently 
appreciable and merely incidental effect on the conditions of the internal 
market, it violated the principle of conferral for want of a proper legal basis 
in the Treaties.21
Applying these criteria, the Court in Alliance for Natural Health confirmed 
that it is not per se forbidden to ban the marketing of a product in the context 
of a measure adopted under Article 114 TFEU.22 The case concerned a 
15 N 3, para 58.
16 Ibid.
17 N 3, para 89.
18 N 3, para 58.
19 N 3, para 91.
20 N 4, para 23.
21 N 3, para 116.
22 N 5, paras 38–40. 
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legislative act containing certain prohibitions on the marketing of products 
which had not been cleared for human consumption. At the same time, the 
contested measure ensured that those products which had been approved 
under the system established for their control could freely circulate throughout 
the internal market. But apart from the fact that the measure in Alliance 
for Natural Health, unlike that in Tobacco advertising I, actually created 
conditions for free movement of food additives within an internal market, the 
measure differed as regards the definition of the relevant market for product 
or services. This is relevant for the definition of when an actual or potential 
distortion of competition can be found. The definition of such market is often 
only undertaken implicitly by the Courts. Openly addressing this definition 
would be preferable in that it might well contribute to further clarification of 
the reasoning behind a judgment.
According to the principle of conferral, the legality of legislative ‘measures’ 
under Article 114 TFEU in today’s case law of the ECJ therefore contains the 
following key criteria:23 Article 114 TFEU cannot be used to erase all forms 
of disparities between national rules.24 Instead, disparities between national 
regulatory approaches, in order to qualify, must be found to ‘obstruct’ the 
fundamental freedoms in a specific sector, and thus have a direct and not 
merely incidental effect on the functioning of the internal market or the 
conditions of competition therein.25 On the basis of this finding, Article 114 
TFEU can also be used to remove existing or prevent likely appreciable future 
obstructions.26 Article 114 TFEU can also be used as legal basis for subsequent 
updates and adaptation of legislative acts originally based on Article 114 
TFEU, when necessary to accommodate new circumstances or technical and 
scientific developments.27 Within these limits, there is legislative discretion in 
relation to the method of approximation most appropriate for achieving the 
desired result.28 The Union legislature is obliged to balance various interests 
and societal values ‘once the competence is triggered by the need to harmonise 
a particular field’ in the context of Article 114 TFEU.29
23 See for an overview especially K Lenaerts, ‘The European Court of Justice and Process–oriented 
Review’, College of  Europe, Research Paper in Law 1/2012, 4. See for criticism of this set of criteria 
eg S Weatherill, ‘The Limits of Legislative harmonization Ten years after Tobacco Advertising: How 
the Court’s Case Law has become a “Drafting Guide”’, (2011) 12 German Law Journal , 827, 827. In 
his view, the use of these criteria risks becoming part of a circular pattern which relies on ‘approved 
but reliably vague vocabulary’.
24 Opinion of AG Miguel Poiares Maduro of 1 October 2009 in Vodafone (n 6) para 1: ‘this is 
not a provision intended to give to the Community a general power of regulation over the internal 
market’.
25  Judgment in Tobacco advertising I (n 3 above) paras 84 and 106.
26 Case C-301/06 Ireland v Parliament and Council (Data retention) [2009] ECR I-593, para 64.
27 Case C-491/01 British American Tobacco (Investments) and Imperial Tobacco (Tobacco 
advertising II) [2002] ECR I-11453, paras 77 and 78, and Case C-374/05 Gintec  [2007] ECR I-9517, 
para 29.
28  Eg Smoke flavourings (n 7 above), para 43.
29 Maduro (n 24 above) para 8. Obviously high levels of protection of values protected by Union 
law including those listed in Article 114(3) TFEU must be ensured – see eg Alliance for Natural 
Health and Others (n 5 above) para 30.
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2. Proportionality and Subsidiarity
One of the reasons for the definition by the ECJ of detailed limits on the use 
of Article 114 TFEU under the principle of conferral is that the choice of legal 
basis is subject to full judicial review. By contrast, the review of the exercise 
of the powers once conferred is more limited, given that the Court must take 
account of the existing broad legislative discretion of the EU legislature in these 
matters which requires some more or less pronounced judicial self-restraint. 
In the context of this review, the Court has developed in the past few years 
a key instrument which is based on the fact that review of compliance with 
the principles of subsidiarity and particularly of proportionality is based on 
a certain degree of information about the motivation for the legislative choice 
and potential alternatives which had not been adopted in the process. This 
has led the Court to oscillate between exercising restraint and undertaking an 
increasingly more stringent review of compliance with legislative procedures, 
incidentally having an effect on the legislative substance also. 30 
One key step in this direction was Vodafone,31 in which various mobile 
telephone operators challenged the legality of an EU regulation on roaming 
charges which had been based on what today is Article 114 TFEU.32 This 
regulation had the effect of capping the fees that telephone service operators 
could charge their customers for cross-border calls within the internal market. 
The Commission’s impact assessment study had found that mobile phone 
operators were using national licences which allowed for service provision 
within specific territories of individual Member States to charge customers who 
were moving within the internal market exorbitant fees which often stood in no 
relation to the cost associated with providing this service. 
Reviewing the legality of the legislation capping the fees, Advocate General 
Maduro in Vodafone suggested a new kind of procedure-based review of 
compliance with the principle of proportionality. He suggested taking into 
account the institutions’ impact assessment reports to analyse whether the 
legislature had complied with the requirements of the Court’s proportionality 
test, especially whether the legislature had reviewed whether there were regulatory 
alternatives which were less onerous with regard to the applicants’ rights. He 
was satisfied with compliance with the proportionality test inter alia on the 
ground that the legislature had analysed, prior to adopting the Regulation, the 
relevant alternative means of achieving the objective under Article 114 TFEU, 
and had not found solutions which were less onerous for the applicants’ rights 
than the solutions chosen by the Union legislature in the Regulation.33 The ECJ 
confirmed the Opinion in its judgment, establishing that the Regulation was 
aimed at bringing to an end an activity which was detrimental to the provision 
30 See eg A Alemanno and A Meuwese, ‘Impact Assessment of EU Non-Legislative Rulemaking: 
The Missing Link of “New” Comitology’, (2013) 19 European Law Journal  76.
31 N 6.
32 [2007] OJ L171/32, amended by Regulation No 544/2009, [2009] OJ L167/12 (enlarging the 
scope of application to SMS and data roaming).
33  Maduro (n 24), paras 38–40.
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of mobile telephone services within the internal market, and that it was 
thereby genuinely aimed at improving the conditions for the establishment and 
functioning of the internal market.34 The distortions of competition arose from 
the fact that telephone companies were essentially exploiting to the disadvantage 
of the consumers the territorially exclusive licences which Member States had 
accorded to them. In doing so, the Court followed the ‘procedural’ approach to 
proportionality-review proposed by Advocate General Maduro.35 
The ECJ has applied this procedure-based approach to the review of the 
principle of proportionality, making reference to impact assessment studies by the 
institutions, in Afton Chemicals 36 and Luxembourg v Commission.37 Lenaerts, 
himself a judge at the ECJ though writing in a personal capacity, comments that 
under the Vodafone approach, the ECJ ‘applies the principle of proportionality 
in a procedural fashion’ by focussing not on the regulatory substance of the 
measure but on whether the institutions showed that they ‘had examined different 
regulatory options and assessed their economic, social and environmental impact’ 
before adopting a legislative act.38 This approach so far developed for the review 
of  proportionality could potentially also be applied for review of compliance 
with the principle of subsidiarity. This has, as far as I can see, so far not been done. 
III. ARTICLE 114 TFEU AND STRUCTURAL MEASURES – QUI PEUT LE PLUS, 
PEUT LE MOINS ?
Whilst the decision on the allocation of regulatory powers which was addressed in 
Tobacco advertising I was, at the end of the day, one of the transfer of legislative 
power tout court, the possibilities of what could be understood as a ‘measure’ 
under Article 114 TFEU have since been expanded.39 It has branched out into 
two related sub-issues: one is the question of the degree of ‘Europeanisation’ 
of the implementation of a policy through sub-legislative measures, the other 
is the question of whether instead of wholesale legislative harmonisation more 
cooperative and sovereignty-preserving means could be identified.40 
Two ‘post-Tobacco advertising I’ cases illustrate this change in nature and 
perception of integration. Smoke flavourings41 and ENISA42 are both disputes 
concerning the extent and limits of the powers conferred on the Union under 
what was Article 95 EC, now Article 114 TFEU.43 They each raise the question 
34 N 6, para 32.
35 N 6, referring to the impact assessment report in paras 45, 55, 58 and three times in para 65. 
36 Case C-343/09 Afton Chemical Limited [2010] ECR I-7027.
37 Case C-176/09 Luxembourg v European Parliament/Commission [2011] ECR I-3727.
38 Lenaerts, n 23 above, 7.
39 See eg, with great detail, H-H Herrnfeld, AEUV Artikel 114, in J Schwarze (ed) EU-Kommentar, 
3rd edition (Baden-Baden, Nomos, 2012) 1421–1476. 
40 See, eg Smoke flavourings (n 7) and ENISA ( n 8) which will be discussed in greater detail later 
in this paper.
41 N 7.
42 N 8.
43 Comments in the literature on these two judgements have included worries that they might 
‘inflame the perennial tensions underlying the division of competence between the Community 
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of resorting to European agencies and, in Smoke flavourings, also that of using 
a comitology procedure as means to reduce the ‘hard’ legislative approach 
to harmonisation, and achieve legislative goals through the use of forms of 
integrated administration. 
In ENISA, the UK relied essentially on the illegality of using (what is now) 
Article 114 TFEU as the legal basis for adopting structural ‘measures’ instead 
of the ‘straightforward’ approximation of the rules of the Member States. In 
this case, the structural measure was the creation of the European Network 
and Information Security Agency (‘ENISA’) as an EU agency with its own legal 
personality and designed to advise Member States on matters related to safety 
of information networks. Similarly, in Smoke flavourings the UK incidentally 
challenged the use of what is now Article 114 TFEU as the legal basis for the 
empowerment of an EU agency – the European Food Safety Authority – to 
participate in a procedure provided by law to establish a market authorisation 
for certain food additives referred to as smoke flavourings. In the absence of 
general regulatory powers of the Union in the area of the internal market, in the 
UK’s view Article 114 TFEU merely intended to confer powers for the adoption 
of measures directed at the Member States. Under this view, the creation of 
multiple-step regulatory procedures failed to harmonise national law directly 
and was thus illegal.44 Similarly, in ENISA, the UK contested the legality of the 
regulation establishing ENISA as a ‘measure’ under Article 114 TFEU.45 The UK 
argued that the creation of an agency to improve the conditions of the exchange 
of information within the internal market could not be regarded as a measure 
designed to approximate Member State law, since it was not aimed directly at 
addressing the conditions of competition in a specific policy field. 
The Court’s judgements in Smoke flavourings and ENISA are noteworthy 
specifically because they do not follow the applicant’s approach of portraying 
the possibilities of EU law in terms of a two-level model, in which the EU may 
exclusively legislate and Member States must maintain all implementing powers. 
In Smoke flavourings, the ECJ held by contrast that the Union legislature 
enjoyed discretion ‘as regards the harmonisation technique most appropriate 
for achieving the desired result’.46 This may include cases ‘where the Community 
and the Member States’ and have the ‘potential to enliven concerns about the magnitude of the 
Community’s competence’: K Gutman, Case note on Case C-66/04, Smoke Flavourings; Case 
C-436/03, SCE; and Case C-217/04, ENISA, (2006/2007) 13 Columbia Journal of  European Law 
147, 182. For further critical reviews of the cases, especially with respect to the principle of conferral 
see A Epiney, ‘Anmerkung zu C-217/04, (2007) Neue Verwaltungsrechts Zeitschrift, 1012; M 
Ludwigs, ‘Artikel 95 als allgemeine Kompetenz zur Regelung des Binnenmarktes oder als “begrenzte 
Einzelermächtigung”?’, (2006) Europäische Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht, 417.
44 The UK acknowledged that establishing a detailed decision-making procedure with a 
regulatory committee procedure assisting and supervising the Commission, whose decisions are 
prepared with input from the European Food Safety Agency established a procedure which could 
result in harmonisation of national law. That, according to the argument, was too far removed to be 
acceptable under Art 95 EC.
45 Reg EC 460/2004 of the European Parliament and Council of 10 March 2004, [2004] OJ L77/1. 
The UK argued that Art 308 EC, requiring unanimity in the Council, would have been the correct 
legal basis for such a measure.
46 N 7 paras 45 and 46.
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legislature establishes the detailed rules for making decisions at each stage of 
such an authorisation procedure, and determines and circumscribes precisely 
the powers of the Commission as the body which has to take the final decision’.47
AG Kokott’s Opinion had stressed this latter point by entering into a detailed 
analysis of the principles of proportionality and subsidiarity comparing 
different possible regulatory approaches in the case. These consisted of, on the 
one hand, a multi-step procedure for establishing a list of marketable smoke 
flavouring food additives, which consisted of a comitology committee procedure 
for decision-making in combination with scientific analysis prepared by the 
European Food Safety Authority. She compared this with, on the other hand, 
a more traditional notion, generally referred to as ‘executive federalism’. This 
consists of harmonising legislation on the European level and implementation 
by the Member States, combined with the obligation of mutual recognition 
on the Member States regarding administrative decisions within the internal 
market. In the long term the latter solution, she reasoned, could not only lead 
to conflicts between Member States to the disadvantage of the internal market. 
It also risks restricting the competences of the Member States ‘just as much’ as 
the solution chosen by the Regulation, and ‘would at the same time make the 
procedure for the authorisation of smoke flavourings considerably clumsier and 
if anything reduce the rights of participation of manufacturers’.48 
In ENISA, the ECJ rejected the UK’s claim and recognised the validity of 
the contested Regulation. It held that, first, the addressees of ‘measures’ are 
not exclusively the Member States. Second, the objective of the Regulation, ‘to 
improve the conditions for the establishment and functioning of the internal 
market’49 by creating a ‘body responsible for contributing to the implementation 
of a process of harmonisation’ where ‘the adoption of non-binding supporting 
and framework measures seems appropriate,’ was in conformity with Article 
114 TFEU.50 Third, echoing the requirements developed in Tobacco advertising 
I, the Court found that the tasks conferred on such a body must be ‘closely 
linked to the subject matter of approximation of laws’. 
To these criteria, one might also add, in the words of the judgment in Tobacco 
advertising I, the requirement that the measure ‘genuinely have as its object to 
improve the conditions for the establishment and functioning of the internal 
market’,51 by preventing or eliminating an actual or potential ‘appreciable 
distortion of competition’ or ‘the emergence of future obstacles to trade resulting 
from multifarious development of national laws’.52 In view of the Court, in a 
field of complex and rapidly developing technical circumstances the creation 
of an agency providing technical advice facilitated the implementation of EU 
47 N 7 para 49.
48 Opinion of Advocate General Kokott in Smoke flavorings (n7 above) para 47.
49 N 8 above, para 42, with reference to Smoke flavourings.
50 N 8 above, paras 44 and 45. The Court explains that ‘[s]uch is the case in particular where 
the Community body thus established provides services to national authorities and/or operators 
which affect the homogenous implementation of harmonising instruments and which are likely to 
facilitate their application.’
51 Judgment (n 3), para 84. 
52 Ibid para 86. 
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law, and thereby made a real contribution to the achievement of the internal 
market.53 ‘Low-intensity approximation’ in the form of establishing an agency 
providing advice to national bodies who remain free to exercise their discretion 
and adopt different measures than the ones proposed, is possible,54 in this 
context, under an ‘a maiore ad minus’ argument. Applying an approach based 
on administrative cooperation in order to achieve technically sound solutions, 
while at the same time devising a sovereignty-preserving measure,55 appeared 
to the ECJ to give effect to the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. 
Therefore, although the principle of conferral remains the basis of the rule of 
law and the control of whether the Union has acted within its competencies, for 
the delimitation of EU law, conferral needs to be understood in the context of 
an integrated legal system, for the most part in the form of executive networks 
with participants from the Member States, the Union institutions and private 
parties.56 Interestingly, the development of a system of decentralised yet 
cooperative administrative structures historically goes hand in hand with the 
emergence of subsidiarity as a constitutional notion.57
IV. MEASURES MATURING – SHORT SELLIING DELEGATION?
The Court of Justice recently added a layer to these considerations in Short 
selling.58 The case concerns predominantly the validity of an EU legislative 
provision, that is, Article 28 of the EU regulation on short selling and certain 
aspects of credit default swaps,59 and also addresses the creation of the 
European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) on the basis of Article 114 
TFEU. ESMA is one of the three EU agencies established in 2011 to support the 
surveillance of key financial actors within an Economic and Monetary Union.60 
Article 28 of the Regulation vests ESMA with powers to intervene inter alia 
by adopting binding legal acts addressed to individuals, in the event of threats 
to the orderly functioning or the stability of financial markets or the financial 
system in the EU. These may contain injunctions to comply with various 
53 N 8, paras 60–66. It needs to be added that in ENISA, the ECJ did not agree with AG Kokott’s 
Opinion. AG Kokott had argued that Art 95 EC was not the correct legal basis for measures which 
are not closely related to the approximation of national law. In this way, she argued, it was immaterial 
whether the measure finally adopted ‘had less of an effect on national competences than a genuinely 
approximating measure’ (Opinion of AG Kokott (n 8) para 39).
54 N 8, paras 25 and 38.
55 Especially when compared with full-scale detailed regulation for transposition in Member 
States under a more traditional two-level model.
56 M Egeberg, ‘Europe’s Executive Branch of Governments in the Melting Pot: An Overview’ in M 
Egeberg (ed), Multilevel Union Administration (London, Palgrave, 2006) 1. 
57 HCH Hofmann, ‘Conflicts and Integration: Revisiting Costa v ENEL and Simmental II‘ in M 
Maduro and L Azoulai (eds), The Past and the Future of  EU Law (Oxford, Hart, 2010), 66.
58  Judgment, n 9  above.
59 Regulation (EU) No 236/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 March 2012 
on short selling and certain aspects of credit default swaps [2012] OJ L86/1.
60 Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010 of the European Parliament and the Council of 24 November 
2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Securities and Markets Authority) 
[2011] OJ L 331/1.
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disclosure requirements and a prohibition against entering into certain types 
of transactions, namely those commonly known amongst market participants 
as ‘short selling’.61 The UK claimed inter alia that Article 114 TFEU was an 
invalid legal basis for authorising EMSA to impose prohibitions on short selling 
under Article 28 of the Regulation. This would not only constitute a breach of 
the limits on delegation to agencies set by the Court in the Meroni judgment 
of the early days of European integration.62 It would also be ultra vires Article 
114 TFEU, as that provision does not allow for the delegation of individual 
regulatory decisions overriding those taken by national authorities.63 
Short selling thereby combines the various strands of the ongoing debate 
about the limits of Article 114 TFEU – the questions of substance and procedure, 
and regarding which structural measures can be adopted as ‘measures’ for the 
approximation of the conditions on the internal market. Accordingly, AG 
Jääskinen’s Opinion looked at the limits of Article 114 TFEU as a legal basis in 
two respects: first, for the adoption of a structural measure such as the creation 
of ESMA as an EU agency, and second, for the substantive question of whether 
ESMA could be vested with the power to adopt measures prohibiting certain 
market activities such as short selling, even in cases in which the supervisory 
authorities of the Member State saw no reason to intervene. Instead of 
considering the preliminary question of the legality of the creation of an agency 
vested with these powers, the Court, by contrast, mixes the questions of the 
empowerment of the agency with that of its creation.  
Regarding the creation of an agency such as ESMA on the basis of Article 
114 TFEU, the Court had established inter alia in ENISA and Smoke flavourings 
that Article 114 TFEU allows not only for the adoption of measures addressed 
at Member States but also for the creation of structures under EU law such as 
agencies. The Advocate General found that creating ESMA and conferring on 
it the power to regulate short selling activities was in fact undertaken in view of 
the divergences in Member State rules. The EU legislature claims that this was 
one of the causes of the market volatility which had led to the financial crises 
since 2008. Given the legislative discretion in this field, in view of the Advocate 
General, there should be no objection in principle ‘to the establishment of ESMA 
and the regulation of its tasks and powers on the basis of Article 114 TFEU’.64 
The Court, by discussing the matter principally in the context of delegation of 
powers outside of Articles 290 and 291 TFEU, implicitly concurred with that 
approach.65 
The second question concerning ESMA’s power to adopt individual 
measures on the basis of Article 28 of the Regulation is more problematic. 
61 Article 28 (1)(b) and (2)(a) of Regulation (EU) No 236/2012 of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 14 March 2012 on short selling and certain aspects of credit default swaps [2012] 
OJ L86/1.
62 Case 9/56 Meroni v High Authority [1957 and 1958] ECR 133. The case concerned the legality 
of delegation of powers from the High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community to 
bodies established under Belgian law.
63 Judgment, n 9 above, paras 28–34, 89 and 90.
64 Opinion, n 9 above, paras 32–34.
65 Judgment, n 9 above, paras 78–86.
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Whether the conferral of powers to regulate and prohibit certain types of 
trades on financial markets falls within the scope of Article 114 TFEU can 
be judged against the criteria of ‘whether or not the decisions of the agency 
concerned either contribute or amount to internal market harmonisation, in 
the sense this notion is used in EU law.’66 For the Advocate General, it was 
not the fact of ESMA having been granted the power to impose a prohibition 
on, or lay down conditions related to, short selling, which would render the 
powers vested in ESMA ultra vires with regard to Article 114 TFEU. Instead, 
the Advocate General, siding with the applicant Member State, found Article 
28 of the Regulation conferring powers on ESMA to be objectionable because 
it allowed to ‘lift implementation powers … from the national level to the EU 
level when there is disagreement between ESMA and the competent national 
authority or between national authorities’.67 In his view, this did not comply 
with the three most central criteria for the application of Article 114 TFEU 
requiring approximation of Member State law: first, whether the emergence 
of obstacles to the conditions of competition on the internal market is 
‘likely’, and the measure was designed to prevent these obstacles; second, 
whether the measure would ‘genuinely’ improve the conditions on the internal 
market,68 and, third, whether the emergence of obstacles to the conditions of 
competition on the internal market was ‘closely linked to the subject matter of 
the acts approximating’ the Member State provisions.69 
The Court, however, dismissed the Advocate General’s view that a 
harmonisation measure under Article 114 TFEU, such as Article 28 of the 
Regulation, should only allow for the adoption of a general regulatory 
measure such as establishing standards for national agencies.70 It found that 
‘general laws alone may not be sufficient to ensure the unity of the market,’71 
especially in view of the fact that measures under Article 114 TFEU did not 
necessarily have to be addressed at the Member States. After all, the idea of a 
close relation between disturbances on the financial markets and certain market 
behaviour seems to be a necessary pre-condition for action of the agency 
under Article 28 of the Regulation. Therefore, the action of an EU agency 
intervening vis-à-vis individuals could still be deemed the approximation 
of the Member State provisions in the core sense of Article 114 TFEU.  The 
Court had little to say about whether the prohibition of an activity such as 
short selling would fall foul of the conditions for the regulation of the internal 
market established by Tobacco advertising I and Alliance for Natural Health 
which required some sort of market to remain regulated. It simply referred 
to the necessity of creating a ‘common regulatory framework with regard to 
66 Opinion, n 9 above N 9 para 36.
67 Ibid, paras 50 et seq.
68 Opinion, n 9, para 46, with reference to Tobacco advertising I (n 3).
69 Tobacco advertising I (n 3) paras 84–86; ENISA (n 8) para 44.
70 Judgment, n 9 above, para 45; A Orator, ‘Die unionsrechtliche Zulässigkeit von 
Eingriffsbefugnissen der ESMA im Bereich von Leerverkäufen‘‚ (2013)  Europäische Zeitschrift für 
Wirtschaftsrecht  852.
71 Judgment, n 9 above, para 106. 
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requirements and powers relating to short selling and credit default swaps’.72 
However, from the context of the judgment it would appear that the Court 
assessed that an exceptional and occasional banning of certain specific market 
activity was consistent with the requirements of Article 114 TFEU. Whether 
the prohibition of one activity was part of the regulation of a greater market, 
or simply limited the scope of a specific one, was not openly discussed. The 
issue of the reach of powers under Article 114 TFEU and the necessity of there 
remaining a market to be regulated will therefore continue to be an open issue 
in the future. The strict criteria set up by Tobacco advertising in the context of 
setting the limits of internal market harmonisation this regard, seem to have 
been an exception of clarity. 
At the end of the day, the judgment in Short selling, which following the 
Opinion of Advocate General Jääskinen, could have become another milestone 
in the developing case law on Article 114 TFEU, does not live up to expectations. 
It will not be remembered for its necessary definition and explanation of Article 
114 TFEU. It might instead, rather sadly, become cited for its quite unwarranted 
expansion of the Meroni doctrine. Prior to this case, the Court had consistently 
applied Meroni only to specific cases of sub-delegation of powers by the 
institutions.73 The Advocate General had convincingly dissected the principles 
contained in Meroni which were also generally applicable beyond that limited 
scope.74 But the Court, seemingly eager to follow the lead of the pleas of the 
applicant Member State, instead of simply ignoring a false lead and leaving 
Meroni aside, as it had for example in ENISA and Smoke flavouring but also in 
Schräder v CPVO,75 in Short selling discusses questions of when the delegation 
of discretionary powers is too broad to be permissible. Lacking any definition 
of what it understands as ‘discretionary powers’, instead of clarifying the issue 
the Court in Short selling further confuses the matter of delegation under EU 
law. In so doing, it has opened the door wide open to litigation arising from a 
host of different notions of discretion, stemming both from considerations on 
procedure and the extent of judicial review, as well as from matters of substance. 
It would have been far better to have left Meroni to rest in the well-deserved 
peace of the Court’s archives. 
72 Ibid, para 114.
73 See with further detail, HCH Hofmann and A Morini, ‘Constitutional Aspects of the 
Pluralisation of the EU Executive through “Agencification”’, (2012) 36 European Law Review, 419, 
423–426.
74 Opinion, n 9 above, paras 61–64.
75 Without discussing Meroni or equating the discretion exercised by the Community Plant 
Variety Office (CVPO) with the quasi-legislative discretionary powers of the type discussed in 
Meroni, the General Court held in Schräder that an agency, such as the CPVO, can be entrusted with 
the exercise of administrative discretion, including a certain margin of appreciation. As a result it 
did not subject the exercise of a power requiring complex scientific and technical appraisals to ‘strict 
review in the light of objective criteria’, but accepted the limited nature of judicial review of certain 
agency decisions in the field akin to trade mark law (Case T-187/06 Schräder v CPVO [2008] ECR II-
3151, para 63, confirmed on appeal in C-38/09 P Schräder v CPVO [2010] ECR I-3209; cf judgment 
in Short selling, n 3 above, para 41).
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V. THE NEW FRONTIERS OF INTERNAL MARKET LEGISLATION?
This overview of some of the main cases on the limits of legislation under Article 
114 TFEU decided in the last decade and a half illustrate the dynamic development 
of the Union. It is moving away from a traditional two-level legal system, with the 
Union legislating and the Member States implementing and towards an integrated 
legal system linking the various levels through ever more procedural cooperation 
in implementation. In this process, Article 114 TFEU continues to be an important 
legal basis, not least for the reason that the internal market remains at the heart 
of the European integration project. The last few years have seen a reinforcement 
of earlier trends towards deeper integration, though not predominantly in the 
sense of ever more matters being addressed by EU legislation. On the contrary, 
the use of EU agencies as coordinators of the activities of the Member States 
in implementing EU policies might even be seen as a means of replacing the 
need at the EU level for increasingly detailed legislation harmonizing Member 
State law. This predominantly competence-friendly and subsidiarity-enhancing 
approach has been accepted by the Court of Justice in the context of what might 
be described as an ‘a maiore ad minus’ approach. 
The new frontier, it appears with Short selling, is how far the agencies may 
be empowered to adopt measures vis-à-vis market participants and other 
individuals, when the agency exercises regulatory powers normally reserved to 
national regulators. Short selling allows the conferral of regulatory powers in 
the internal market on a body created on the basis of Article 114 TFEU, which 
powers are to be used ad hoc and selectively. But what Short selling gives with 
one hand, it takes away with the other by limiting the possibilities of delegation 
to an agency because it relies on an ill-defined and altogether quite woolly 
definition of ‘discretionary powers’. These questions thus straddle the borders 
of the past developments of defining the limits for using Article 114 TFEU 
for general legislative measures, as well as the limits of its use for structural 
‘measures’. The combination of structural, individual and general measures will 
require a new set of limits which have not so far been defined in the case law. 
Additionally, it would appear from the discussion of the matter in this chapter, 
that the question of the distortion of conditions of competition might require 
further development. Which conditions of competition in which markets need 
to be addressed appears to be a worthwhile topic of further reflection – perhaps 
more so than the mode of delivery of the ‘measure’ for approximation on which 
cases such as ENISA, Smoke flavourings and Short selling had concentrated. 
The suggestion might be, to use the language of financial markets, to go long on 
content and short on modes of delivery.
